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Abstract
In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care
services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal
with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more
efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The rea-
son for this is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more
efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negoti-
ation failure. This allows them to extract a higher surplus from the third-party
payer.
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1 Introduction.
The simultaneous existence of a public financing entity (third-party payer) and
private providers of health care motivates the existence of contracts governing the
relationship between the third-party payer and the providers.
A popular contractual form is the setting of a fee for service - the financing
institution pays a pre-determined amount for a given service per patient treated.
Despite a general trend towards different contractual forms, in some countries, and
for certain services provided, this approach is still dominant.1
In public systems, it is often the case that the National Health Service (NHS)
contracts with private providers the provision of health care services. Typically, the
value of the fee is set in a negotiation procedure between the NHS and either an
association representing providers or some providers individually. An interesting
economic question here is whether the NHS would do better negotiating with an
association instead of selecting the largest companies as preferential partners. At
first sight, negotiating with the largest companies, which are also more efficient in
production, may lead to lower prices. These firms can accommodate lower prices
due to lower production costs. Negotiating with an association would mean that the
interests of smaller, inefficient, companies would be considered, driving prices up.
It is important to keep in mind that professional associations may act as devices
to disclose information (mostly aggregate) for its members, but not as collusive
devices. It is beyond the scope of our analysis to go into the governance rules of
professional associations.
This view, however, ignores the fact that the more efficient companies may be
tougher negotiators, and thus obtain a better (higher) price, which is extended af-
terwards to all other companies. This is the case, for instance, in the Portuguese
dialysis sector where the NHS negotiates the price of a dialysis session with the
two largest companies and extends the agreed price to all companies. The bar-
gaining strength comes from the fallback value (outside option) in case of failure
1See Mossialos and Le Grand (1999, pp.17–19) for a review of payment systems for health care
providers in the European Union.
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in negotiations. For instance, assuming that patients will be treated, even if at the
cost of direct payments, the more efficient companies will have relatively higher
profits. Thus, they will be more demanding in negotiations than a sectoral asso-
ciation, because the latter takes into account the relatively low profits of the less
efficient companies. Consequently, the association is willing to concede a less fa-
vorable surplus division in order to avoid failure of negotiations. In other words,
the negotiation with the more efficient firms may benefit all providers and lead to
higher expenditure by the NHS. If, alternatively, we assume that patients will not
be treated by these providers in the case of negotiation failure, then the reinforce-
ment of bargaining power of providers associated with the negotiation procedure
including only the more efficient ones does not exist.2 There remains only the first
effect: more efficient firms are more willing to take lower prices. In this case,
the NHS benefits from negotiating with the more efficient providers only, instead
negotiating with a sectoral association.
A seemingly attractive alternative system is to reimburse patients. However,
doing so leads to higher prices than under the negotiation process (as companies
have pricing freedom and patients, under full insurance, are insensitive to price
differences).3 In our motivating example, the nature of the disease justifies the
presumption that patients will be treated even if by own-pocket payment (chronic
renal insufficiency, if not compensated by dialysis or a kidney transplant, leads to
death). Thus, we conclude that the NHS should negotiate with a sectoral associ-
ation and not with the more efficient, largest, providers. As it will be apparent
from the formal analysis, the main insight is not specific to this example, being
applicable whenever a third-party payer negotiates with health care providers.
We still have an open question to tackle. This refers to the reason why the third-
party payer may want to participate in a negotiation. In our model individuals have
an ex-ante probability of getting sick. Once these (individual) probabilities are
realized we have a population of patients seeking treatment. We concentrate in this
part of the game rather than in the full game. As usual in this situations, issues of
2The NHS may resort to its own facilities, for example.
3See Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2002).
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universal access to health care services, equity, adverse selection, etc. arise. Thus,
there appears a demand for insurance providing a role for third-party payers. That
role creates economic value, which is shared with providers by means of higher
prices.
There are, of course, other mechanisms to determine the price from the third-
party payer’s point of view. Alternatives like “any willing provider” type of con-
tracts are explored in a companion paper, Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2000). The
aim of this paper though is to provide some rationale for the particular way to
determine prices in the situation described.
The next sections are devoted to the formal presentation of the argument. The
second section shows that without asymmetries, it is irrelevant whether the negotia-
tion is done with a subset of companies or with an association. The third section in-
troduces cost asymmetries and establishes our main result. Next, the fourth section
shows the result to be reversed if patients are not treated in the event of negotiation
failure. Section four deals explicitly with the issue of the investment in capacity by
the public sector. Finally, section six presents some concluding remarks.
2 The model.
We consider a setting where a third-party payer, say a National Health Service
(NHS), has to negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We assume,
for the moment, zero production costs in the provision of health care and the exis-
tence of two providers. The former assumption is relaxed in section 3.
Price negotiation can be carried out under two different regimes. In the first
one, the providers join a sectoral or professional association. The association ne-
gotiates the price with the NHS. In the second regime, the NHS negotiates the price
with one provider and extends the agreed price to the contract involving the other
provider. In particular, when cost asymmetries exist we assume the NHS to ne-
gotiate with the more efficient provider. This assumption and its implications are
discussed in the final section. The negotiation outcome is described by the Nash
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bargaining solution.4
In the case of failure to reach an agreement, both providers compete in the
market. Competition takes place on price. Since we consider cases where demand
is essentially exogeneous and has to be fully satisfied, this is a more natural as-
sumption than quantity competition.5 We assume providers to be characterized by
horizontal product differentiation as perceived by the consumer. Differentiation
can be due to geographical distance and/or subjective preferences of the consumer,
for example. This means that we model market interaction as a Hotelling product
differentiation situation. Providers are located at the endpoints of a segment [0,1].
Patients are uniformly distributed along the line, with unit mass.
Consumers are insured and face a copayment rate s. This assumption is in-
nocuous for the analysis. Actually, all the qualitative results hold for any value
s ∈ (0, 1). Note that s = 1 implies no insurance to patients, which would be
contradictory with the role of the third-party payer.
The NHS has a budget M from which it must pay providers. Having free
funds is positively valued by the NHS as it allows for its productive application
elsewhere in the health sector. The gain to the NHS from the negotiation is given
by the difference in the net surplus under negotiation and in the case of failure.
We denote by R such value net of the fallback value. In our simple model, given
the assumption that a positive level of insurance coverage is always guaranteed
to patients, it will be the payment to be made by the NHS to ensure provision in
the private market plus the value, in monetary terms, of the extra insurance level
provided to patients (a copayment s).6
We assume profits of both providers to be equally weighted in the objective
function of the association. An alternative assumption would be to assume that the
more efficient provider has a larger influence in the association’s objectives. This
would leave the qualitative results unchanged, as it would fall between our two
4Extensive presentations of the non-cooperative bargaining theory can be found in Binmore et
al. (1986), Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Roth (1985), among others.
5We assume that even in the presence of an association, providers do not collude. We will discuss
this assumption later.
6See section on insurance value in the Appendix for a formal derivation.
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polar cases.
Denote by Πi, i = A,B the profits of each provider and by Π¯i; i = A,B their
profits in the case of negotiation failure. Profits are then given by
ΠA = xpA, ΠB = (1− x)pB,
where pi, i = A,B, is the price received by each provider and x is the patient
indifferent between providers A and B. This indifferent patient is defined by,
x =
1
2
− s(pA − pB)
2t
.
Parameter t reflects product differentiation, and it is modeled as the (linear) “trans-
port cost” of not consulting the most preferred type of provider.7
According to our assumptions, when the NHS negotiates with an association
that takes into account the interests of both players, the equilibrium price, p, is the
solution to the following program:
max
p
Ω = (R−ΠA −ΠB)δ
(
p− Π¯A − Π¯B
)1−δ = (R− p)δ (p− t/s)1−δ ,
where R ≡ (1−s)ts + I , and δ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the bargaining power of the NHS.
The first part in R denotes the payment to private providers in the private market
equilibrium and I the insurance value to patients. The second equality follows
from ΠA + ΠB = p, and Π¯A + Π¯B = t/s. The first expression comes from the
fact that all patients are treated at price p and treatment costs are zero by assump-
tion. The second one results from the private market equilibrium, which yields an
equilibrium profit of t/2s for each provider.
Note that the price charged by the providers is higher the higher differentiation
is and the more insulated consumers are from the price (lower s). This is the reason
why t and s show up in R - the insurance premium must cover the price charged
by the provider.8 Also, since costs are normalized to zero, the payments made by
the NHS equal the revenues of the firms, which are equal to the profits.
7See Hotelling (1929) or a textbook treatment such as Tirole (1988).
8The equilibrium price is set at t/s, as we assumed, for simplicity and without loss of generality,
zero marginal cost of treatment and the NHS pays only a fraction (1 − s) of the price. See section
on insurance value in the Appendix.
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The first-order condition of the above program can be written as:9
∂Ω
∂p
= −δ
(
R− p
)δ−1(
p− t
s
)1−δ
+ (1− δ)
(
R− p
)δ(
p− t
s
)−δ
= 0.
which, after simplifications yields:
−δ(p− t/s) + (1− δ)(R− p) = 0.
Thus, the equilibrium price is:
p∗ = δt/s+ (1− δ)R.
Consider now the case where the NHS negotiates with, say, provider A and
applies the resulting price to provider B, as well. The program to be solved is:
max
p
Ω =(R−ΠA −ΠB)δ
(
ΠA − Π¯A
)1−δ = (R− p)δ (p/2− t/2s)1−δ
s.t. ΠB ≥ 0.
The second equality follows from Π¯A = 1/2t/s,ΠA+ΠB = p, and equal split
of demand between providers when equal prices are set, meaning that ΠA = p/2.
Note that although the NHS negotiates only with provider A, it takes into ac-
count that the same price will apply to the other provider. A further requirement is
that provider B makes non-negative profits. Thus, market demand will be equally
split. The expression above makes use of profit definitions. It is clear that it yields
the same solution as the first program. Since firms are symmetric, any price that
gives non-negative profits to provider A also ensures the constraint to be satisfied.
The negotiation will, in fact, give strictly positive profits to both providers. Thus,
under symmetry of providers, the NHS and providers are indifferent between the
two alternative procedures. The next section departs from this symmetric world.
9It is straightforward to check that the second-order condition for a maximum of this program
holds.
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3 Negotiating with asymmetric providers.
We now assume that provider A is more cost efficient. Provider B has a production
cost c > 0 per patient treated whereas provider A remains with zero cost. Now, the
equilibrium in a private market without a third-party payer is not symmetric. It is
characterized by10
pA =
cs+ 3t
3s
, pB =
3t+ 2cs
3s
and Π¯A =
(cs+ 3t)2
18ts
, Π¯B =
(3t− cs)2
18ts
. (1)
The above profits define the fallback values for the providers in case of negotiation
failure. It may be the case that the NHS does not have a precise knowledge on firms
marginal costs. Nevertheless, appealing to data like market shares, the facilities
provided by the different providers, the cash-flow, etc., the NHS may infer the
relative position of providers in terms of efficiency. We stylize this situation by
assuming that the firms’ costs are known by the NHS.
When the NHS negotiates with the sectoral/professional association, the equi-
librium solves the following program:
max
p
Ω = (R− p)δ
(
p− c
2
− (cs+ 3t)
2
18ts
− (3t− cs)
2
18ts
)1−δ
,
where now R ≡ (1− s)(xpA + (1− x)pB) + I , and x is the indifferent consumer
between providers A and B. It is given by x = s(pB−pA)2t +
1
2 , and pA and pB are
the private market prices of providers A and B respectively. Solving the first-order
condition yields the equilibrium price:
p+ = (1− δ)R+ δ
(
c
2
+
(cs+ 3t)2
18ts
+
(3t− cs)2
18ts
)
.
Equilibrium profits are given by,
ΠA = p+/2;ΠB = (p+ − c)/2.
Consider now the negotiation with the more efficient provider, which is also
the largest one. The price determined by the negotiation applies to both providers.
10See section on private market equilibrium with asymmetric providers in the appendix.
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We assume the third-party payer wants to have all providers active. The program
to be solved is:
max
p
Ω′ =(R− p)δ
(
p
2
− (3t+ cs)
2
18ts
)1−δ
s.t.
1
2
(p− c) ≥ 0. (2)
Let us first consider the problem without the constraint of non-negative profits for
provider B. Following this, we will show that provider B has strictly positive
profits as well.
The first-order condition leads, after manipulation, to the following equilibrium
price:
p′ = (1− δ)R+ δ (cs+ 3t)
2
9ts
.
We know from the bargaining process that the equilibrium price must be such that
p >
(3t+ cs)2
9ts
.
Thus, if
(3t+ cs)2
9ts
− c > 0
holds, then provider B makes strictly positive profits. This condition can be rewrit-
ten as:
c2s2 + 3t(3t− cs) > 0. (3)
In the private-market equilibrium, prices must cover costs. Thus, from (1), we
require 3t − cs > 0.11 Hence, condition (3) always holds and the non-negative
profit constraint in problem (2) is not binding in equilibrium.
It is straightforward to see that,
p′ − p+ = cδ/6 > 0.
Thus, the price is lower when the NHS negotiates with an association. Since a
uniform price is set in both cases, demand is evenly split between the two providers,
and both earn higher profits if the NHS negotiates with the more efficient one.
11Even if this condition does not hold, the qualitative features of the equilibrium are the same. See
section on equilibrium characterization in the Appendix for a proof of this claim.
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The result hinges on the tougher position taken by the more efficient provider.
Since it is relatively more efficient it has less to lose in the event of negotiation
failure. This drives the price up, and more than compensates the downward effect
of lower costs of production.
4 Providers without outside option.
To see that the main effect comes through the bargaining position induced by a bet-
ter fallback value, consider the following alternative situation in case of negotiation
failure: the NHS is able to totally divert patients to other treatment alternatives.12
In terms of the negotiation process, this means that negotiation failure leads to zero
demand for both providers. In this case, the fallback value for both providers is
zero. Let us now denote by µ the cost of treatment at the public service. Com-
putations similar to those in the previous section show the equilibrium price to be,
when the NHS negotiates with an association,
p+ = µ(1− δ) + δc/2,
while the equilibrium price if the NHS negotiates with the more efficient provider
is:
p′ = µ(1− δ).
It follows directly that
p′ < p+.
From the point of view of the third-party payer, it is better to negotiate with the
more efficient provider and apply that price to the second provider. The result
reverses that of the previous section. The crucial difference is that, in the latter sit-
uation, shifting from negotiating with an association to negotiating with the more
efficient provider does not change the fallback value of providers in case of a break-
down in negotiations. The mechanism that weakened the position of the NHS does
not exist here.
12This may imply a higher cost. If so, R can also differ from the previous case. In particular, it
would be higher in the current section than in the previous one. Such a case would strengthen the
case made in Section 3. The price comparison would not be clear-cut.
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5 Concluding remarks.
We addressed a simple, yet economically significant, question: should a NHS (or
a third-party payer, in general) negotiate prices of health care services with pro-
fessional associations, or should it negotiate only with the more efficient ones and
apply the resulting price to all providers? The first alternative has been common,
but the second one can also be found in the health care sector.
We showed that the apparent benefit of negotiating with the more efficient pro-
viders (obtaining lower prices) can be more than outweighed by a stronger bargain-
ing position of the provider, when compared to dealing with an association. This is
so because a representative association also incorporates in its decisions the (rela-
tively larger) decline in profits of the less efficient firms in the event of negotiation
failure.
The policy implication is that the NHS should avoid negotiating with the largest
providers, if they are significantly more efficient and have a valuable outside option
in the private market (a possibility in case of chronic conditions and lack of capac-
ity in the public system). Instead, it should promote negotiations over prices with
an association representative of all providers’ interests. According to our findings,
all providers benefit from partial negotiation with the efficient firms. So, the as-
sociation will not take over price negotiations without pressure from the NHS for
that to happen.
From the point of view of the providers, they should try to force a negotiation
of the NHS with the largest ones. In the Portuguese dialysis sector, the NHS ne-
gotiates prices for each dialysis session with the two largest providers. The price
settled in this agreement is then applied to all companies. Surprisingly enough,
the smaller companies have not been claiming a role in the price-determination
process. Given that it is reasonable to assume the largest providers are the more
efficient ones, being subsidiaries of vertically integrated multinationals, our model
presents an explanation for the current satisfaction of all firms with the status quo.
All firms benefit from the tougher position of the largest firms, compared to what
would be the stance of an association including all providers. Thus, it seems that
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these providers are able to force the terms of the negotiation on the NHS.
Naturally, the existence of negotiations between the payer and professional as-
sociations in health care is not specific to Portugal or to dyalisis. We found it in
Belgium for determination of hospital fees, of specialized ambulatory care and den-
tal care, for example (Crainich and Closon, 1999). Also in Germany, France and
Austria, negotiations took place between payers and representatives of providers
of ambulatory care.13.
Some caveats apply. Given our results, it is tempting to draw another policy
implication. By reversing the argument, the NHS should attempt to negotiate with
the less efficient providers and then apply this price to all providers. In this case,
we can show that it is also better to negotiate with the professional association.
Nevertheless, this alternative seems to be quite difficult to implement, especially if
the less efficient providers are also the smaller ones in the market. In addition, if
the inefficiency is large enough, a excessively high price may result anyway. Thus,
considering that the NHS has the option, negotiating with the more efficient/largest
providers seems the more reasonable choice.
A second issue that was not treated explicitly is the governance and decision-
making mechanisms of the association, as well as the membership decision by
providers. This is left for future research, though we conjecture the main forces
identified here will not be reversed.
A third aspect to be discussed is the assumption that providers do not collude
in the market, even in the presence of an association. This is reasonable as com-
petition rules explicitly forbid such role for sectoral associations. Nonetheless, if
we allow for collusion, in the case of negotiation failure, prices will be equal to the
reservation price of patients (or an even higher amount if there is a reimbursement
rule by the third-payer). Since out-of-pocket payments put patients at financial risk,
there is room to negotiate prices above this collusive level. The major difference to
our analysis is that, under collusion, breakdown of negotiations does not introduce
13In Germany, the negotiation takes place between sickness funds and physicians’ associations
(Busse and Howorth, 1999); in France, there were the conventions between Assurance-Maladie and
private doctors unions (Lancry and Sandier, 1999); and in Austria, between the regional chambers of
doctors and the social insurance funds (Engelbert, 1999)
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product market asymmetries across providers. The third-party payer would be in-
different between negotiating with an association or with a sub-set of providers,
extending afterwards the settled price to all providers.14
Another assumption deserving discussion is that only one negotiation is car-
ried out. This implies that there is no room for price discrimination. Alternatively,
one could think of a sequential bargaining procedure. In such a case, the NHS
would first negotiate with one provider and then with the other. We provide some
intuition for two alternative scenarios. Negotiate with the most efficient provider
is better when after failing in the bargaining with the more efficient provider, the
third-party payer negotiates with the less efficient provider and excludes the for-
mer from coverage. Also, if the negotiated price with the less efficient provider
is extended to the more efficient provider, then again it is more advantageous for
the third-party payer to negotiate with the more efficient provider only rather than
engage in sequential negotiations. In the analysis we also rule these situations out
because price discrimination on the fee per session is typically seen as undesirable
and usually faces strong opposition by providers. Also, conducting sequential ne-
gotiations adds considerably to transaction costs. The settlement of prices may take
several months and involves the use of real resources by both parties. Taking these
two elements together, we find it reasonable to assume that only one negotiation
takes place and the resulting price applies to all providers.
Summarizing, whenever a third-party payer negotiates prices with providers,
it will do better by dealing with an association inclusive of all providers if the
providers are asymmetric in production costs and face valuable outside options, in
comparison with negotiating with a set of the more efficient providers. This finding
reassesses the role of professional associations in price determination processes, at
least in some health care markets. It does not mean that our insight applies to every
price negotiation that exists in the health care sector. It does call our attention to
some subtleties that have been so far ignored.
14If some providers can be excluded, we fall in the analysis of Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2000).
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Appendix.
Insurance value
We consider a situation where a NHS is financed by contributions from the pop-
ulation, either through the tax system or earmarked contributions. Utility of con-
sumers is given by an utility function U(.) with positive marginal utility and risk
aversion. Let Y be income and T (Y ) be the financial contribution to the health
system.
In the case of negotiation failure, and insurance coverage with copayment s,
the expected utility is
EU1 = qU(Y − T (Y )− t) + (1− q)U(Y − T (Y )),
where q is the probability of being sick and t/s the private market equilibrium price
if patients have to pay a fraction s of the price (s × t/s is then total copayment
by patients). If negotiations succeed, the patient receives full insurance and has
expected utility given by EU2 = U(Y − T (Y ))
The objective function of the National Health Service is given
W = M − p+ λEU,
where EU denotes expected utility of patients, M the financial value available, and
λ ∈ (0, 1) reflect the weight of consumers’ utility on the objective function of the
NHS. the financial value M can be seen as resulting from the patients’ contribu-
tions M =
∫
Y h(Y )T (Y )dY where h is the density function of income distribu-
tion in the population. Both p and EU determine the fallback value for the NHS,
W¯ :
W¯ = M − (1− s) t
s
+ λEU1.
Then,
W − W¯ = λq[U(Y − T (Y ))− U(Y − T (Y )− t)] + (1− s) t
s
− p =
I + (1− s) t
s
− p,
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where I represents the insurance value to patients. Finally, we define
R ≡ I + (1− s) t
s
.
Private market equilibrium with asymmetric providers
Assume provider A is more efficient than provider B who faces a production cost
c > 0. The indifferent patient, as usual, is given by
x(pA, pB) =
s(pB − pA)
2t
+
1
2
.
Profits are now defined by,
ΠA = pAx(pA, pB), and ΠB = (pB − c)(1− x(pA, pB)).
First order conditions yield,
pA(pB) =
t
2s
+
pB
2
,
pB(pA) =
t+ cs
2s
+
pA
2
.
Solving for prices we obtain,
pA =
3t+ cs
3s
, and pB =
3t+ 2cs
3s
.
Substituting those prices in the expression of the indifferent patient we obtain the
equilibrium profits,
ΠA =
(3t+ cs)2
18ts
, and ΠB =
(3t− cs)2
18ts
.
Equilibrium characterization
Suppose that 3t − cs < 0 in Section 3. This means that pB < c in the private
market. That is, if negotiations between providers and the third-party payer break
down, the private market outcome results in the least-efficient provider being driven
out of the market.
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Assuming that the reservation price is high enough, the remaining provider
serves the entire market at price p = c− t/s. Even the most distant patient prefers
the more efficient provider.15 Profits of the more efficient provider are, in this case,
Π = c− t/s, as it gets all demand.
This price is higher than the one under duopoly for the more efficient provider
(c − t/s > (3t + cs)/3s under cs > 3t). Then, we have Π¯A = c − t/s. The bar-
gaining solution, when the third-party payer negotiates only with the more efficient
provider solves:
max
p
Ω =(R− p)δ
(
1
2
p− c+ t/s
)1−δ
s.t. p ≥ c.
The constraint ensures that the second provider is active in the market. Let us
ignore for the moment the constraint. The associated first-order condition is,
−δ
(
1
2
p− c+ t/s
)
+ (1− δ)1
2
(R− p) = 0.
The equilibrium price is, therefore,
p∗ = (1− δ)R+ 2δ(c− t/s).
For this to be a well-defined equilibrium, one has to have R − p∗ > 0, which
originates the condition R > 2(c− t/s). Computation of p∗ − c yields,
p∗−c = (1−δ)R+2δ(c−t/s)−c > 2(1−δ)(c−t/s)+2δ(c−t/s)−c = (cs−2t)/s > 0,
where the inequalities follow from the above conditions.
Consider now the negotiation with an association:
max
p
Ω =(R− p)δ
(
p− 1
2
c− c+ t/s
)1−δ
s.t. p ≥ c.
The first-order condition is,
−δ
(
p− 3
2
c+ t/s
)
+ (1− δ)(R− p) = 0.
15To be rigorous, p = c− t/s− ε, where ε is the smallest unit available to denominate prices.
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From it, we obtain the equilibrium price:
p′ = (1− δ)R+ δ
(
3
2
c− t
s
)
.
This equilibrium is well-defined if R − p′ > 0 or R > (3/2)c − t/s. Comparing
the prices under both regimes, we have:
p∗ − p′ = δ
2s
(cs− 2t) > 0.
Thus, like in the main text, the equilibrium price is higher in the case of negotiating
only with the more efficient providers.
Again, it is straightforward to check that all providers make strictly positive
profits:
p′ − c = (1− δ)R+ δ
(
3
2
c− t
s
)
− c > 3
2
c− t
s
− c = cs− 2t
2s
> 0,
since cs > 3t.
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